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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we develop a bi-level human migration model using the concept of conjectural 
variations equilibrium (CVE). In contrast to previous works, here we construct a bi-level 
programming model. The upper level agents are municipalities of competing locations, whose 
strategies are investments into infrastructures of the locations (cities, towns, etc.). These 
investments aim at making the locations more attractive for both the residents and potential 
migrants from other locations. At the lower level of the model, the present residents (grouped into 
professional communities) are also considered as potential migrants to other locations. They make 
their decision where to migrate (if at all) comparing the expected values of the utility functions of 
the destinations and original locations, which are estimated by taking into account their group's 
conjectures concerning equilibrium migration flows between the involved locations. Applying a 
special technique to verify the consistency of the conjectures (influence coefficients), the existence 
and uniqueness results for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) are 
established. 
 
Keywords:  Bilevel Human Migration Model; Variational Inequality Formulation; Consistency Criterion; 
Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
igration problems have been studied actively in many countries throughout the world, as the 
information / migration prediction / data is extremely useful on a large economic scale. Migration 
prediction data can stipulate development of facilities necessary to advance employment, 
education, ecology, etc. Reciprocally, locations with more advanced infrastructure, higher employment capacities, 
ecology-friendly environment, etc., can attract more potential migrants. On the other hand, overloaded 
housing/infrastructure facilities may reduce the comfort in the everyday life. Therefore, one can expect a tradeoff in 
the investments into the locations' infrastructures balanced at a conjectural variations equilibrium state.  In the due 
time period, various migration theories have been developed. In the short historical aspect, one may rely on the 
excellent fundamental survey Akkoyunlu and Vickerman (2001).  
 
Recently, in the works by Bulavsky and Kalashnikov (1994, 1995), a new array of conjectural variations 
equilibria (CVE) was introduced and investigated, in which the influence coefficients of each agent affected the 
structure of the Nash equilibrium. In particular, constant conjectural influence factors were used in the human 
migration model examined in Isac et al. (2002). More precisely, the potential migration groups were taking into 
account not only the current difference between the utility function values at the destination and original locations, 
but also the possible variations in the utility values implied by the change of population volume due to the migration 
flow. These conjectured variations could be described with an aid of the so-called influence coefficient iw . In other 
M 
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words, we considered not a perfect competition (with 0iw  ) but a generalized Cournot-type model with influence 
coefficients iw  in general different from 1 (in contrast to the classical Cournot model, where 1iw  ). 
 
In  their previous papers Kalashnikov et al. (2007, 2008), the authors extended the latter model to the case 
where the conjectural variations coefficients may be not only constants, but also functions of the total population at 
the destination and of the group's fraction in it. Moreover, we allow these functions to take distinct values at the 
abandoned location and at the destination, which should elevate the model's flexibility. As an experimental 
verification of the proposed model, we developed a specific form of the model based upon relevant population data 
of a three-city agglomeration at the boundary of two Mexican states: Durango (Dgo.) and Coahuila (Coah.) Namely, 
we consider the 1980–2005 dynamics of population growth in the three cities: Torreón (Coah.), Gómez Palacio 
(Dgo.) and Lerdo (Dgo.), and propose utility functions of three various kinds for each of the three cities. To our 
knowledge, utility functions of these types were not used in the previous literature dealing with the human migration 
model. After having collected necessary information about the average movement and transportation (i.e., 
migration) costs for each pair of the cities, we apply the above-mentioned human migration model to this example. 
Numerical experiments have been conducted with interesting results concerning the probable equilibrium states 
revealed. 
 
The main novelty of the recent paper Kalashnykova et al. (2011) lies in the proposed definitions of 
consistent conjectures and in the outskirt of possible ways to calculate the consistent conjectures and the related 
consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVES). 
 
Motivated by the ideas of bi-level structures of processes of migration (the upper level competition among 
municipalities, and the lower level equilibrium among the potential migrants), we propose a new (bi-level) 
formulation of the human migration model. Under general enough assumptions, we prove the existence of solutions 
to the bi-level program as well. Results of numerical experiments (which are underway yet) will be outlined only 
scarcely. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 through 3, following mainly the previous papers Kalashnikov 
et al. (2007, 2008) and Kalashnykova et al. (2011), describe the proposed bi-level human migration model, define 
the conjectural variations equilibrium at the lower level, and cite Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 from Kalashnikov et al. 
(2007, 2008), which establish the existence and uniqueness of the lower level equilibrium as a solution of an 
appropriate variational inequality problem. Consistency of conjectures and the existence of the corresponding bi-
level equilibrium are discussed in Section 4. Conclusion (Section 5), acknowledgments, and the list of references 
complete the paper. 
 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES 
 
Similar to Isac et al. (2002) and Kalashnikov et al. (2007, 2008), consider a closed economy with: 
 
n   locations, denoted by  i  
K   classes of population, denoted by k 
k
iQ  initial fixed population of class k in location i 
k
iQ  final population of class k in location i 
k
ijs  
 
migration flow of class k from origin i to destination  j 
   
2
1
2
k k k k k k
ij ij ij ij ik ijc s b s a s  cost of migration for group k from location i to location j 
 
Assume that the migration cost reflects not only the cost of physical movement but also the personal and 
psychological cost as perceived by a class when moving between locations. The utility 
k
iu (attractiveness of location 
i as perceived by class k), depends on the population at destination, that is,  k k ki i iu u Q . This assumption is quite 
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natural: indeed, in many cases, the cities with higher population provide much more possibilities to find a job, better 
medical service and household facilities, a developed infrastructure, etc. On the other hand, when the infrastructure 
development lags behind the modern city demands, the higher population may lead to certain decrease in the living 
standards, and hence, of the utility values. 
 
These utility functions also incorporate parameters reflecting the scale of investments made by the 
location’s authorities in order to improve the infrastructure, employment capacities, household construction, power 
supply, and so on. Exactly these amounts of investment play the role of the municipality strategies in the game at the 
upper level. 
 
First, we describe the lower level problem. The conservation of flow equations, given for each class k and 
each location i, and the inequalities forbidding repeated or chain migration, are listed below: 
 
       1
k
k k k
i ji iji
j i j i
Q Q s s , i ,...,n
 
     ,                                                                                               (1) 
 
and 
 
     1
k
k
ij i
j i
s Q , i ,...,n,

                                                                                                                           (2) 
 
with 0 1kijs , k , ,K; j i    . Denote the problem’s feasible set by 
 
    0    satisfies (1) - (2)M Q,s s , Q,s   . 
 
Equation (1) states that the population of class k at location i is determined by the initial population of class k at 
location i plus the migration flow into i of that class minus the migration flow out of i for that class. Equation (2) 
affirms that the flow out of i by class k cannot exceed the initial population of class k at i, since no chain migration is 
allowed. 
 
 Assume that migrants are rational, and that migration continues until no individual has any incentive to 
move, since a unilateral decision will no longer yield a positive net gain (the gain in the expected utility minus the 
migration cost). 
 
In order to extend the human migration model from Isac et al. (2002), here we introduce the following 
concepts.  
Let 0kijw
   be an influence coefficient taken in account by an individual of class k moving from i to j. This 
coefficient is defined by her assumption that after the movement of kijs individuals of class k from i to j the total 
population of class k at j will become equal to:  
 
k k k
j ij ijQ w s
 .   
 
On the other hand, let 0
k
ijw
   be an influence coefficient conjectured by an individual of class k moving from i to 
j, determined by the assumption that after the movement of 
k
ijs  individuals, the total population of class k in i will 
remain equal to: 
 
k k k
i ij ijQ w s
  . 
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We accept the following assumptions concerning the utility functions and expected variations of the utility values: 
 
A1. The utility ( )
k k k
i i iu u Q  is a monotone decreasing and continuously differentiable function. 
 
A2.  Each person of class k, when considering her possibility of moving from location i to location j, takes into 
account not only the difference in the utility values at the initial location and the destination, but also both 
the expected (negative) increment of the utility function value at j 
 
                                                                                       
k
jk k
ij ij k
j
u
s w
Q



 
 
and the expected (positive) utility value increment in location i 
 
                                                                                     
k
k k i
ij ij k
i
u
s w
Q
 

. 
 
3. DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM  
 
3.1. Definition of Equilibrium in the Lower Level 
 
A multi-class population and flow pattern  * *,Q s M  is an equilibrium in the lower level, if for each 
class 1, ,k K , and for each pair of locations , 1, , ;  i j n i j  , the following relationship holds: 
 
                      
 
 
 
  if  0
  if  0
k
jk k* k * k k*
j ij ij i ijkk
jk k* k * k k k*i
i ij ij ij ij ijk k
i jk k* k * k k*
j ij ij i ijk
j
u
u s w Q , s ;
Qu
u s w Q b a s
Q u
u s w Q , s ;
Q





 
   

   
 
    
                                          (3) 
and 
 
                            
0    if   
0     if   
k* k
il i
l ik
i k* k
il i
l i
, s Q ;
, s Q .



 


 



                                                                                                                   (4) 
 
A3.  We assume that the influence coefficients are functions depending upon the current population at the 
location in question and the migration flow from location i to location j, satisfying the following conditions: 
 
                                  k k k k k kij ij ij ij ij js w Q,s v s Q
    , 
 
and 
 
                                   k k k k k kij ij ij ij ij is w Q,s v s Q
    , 
 
where  
 
                                    0   0   1    k kij ijv , , k , ,J ; i j.
      
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 Taking into account assumption A3 and omitting for shortness the argument *Q in the utility functions, we 
turn (3) into: 
 
             
  if  0
k kk k
j jk k k k k k k k k k k k k k ki i
i ij ij ij i ij ij ij j ij ij ij j i ijk k k k
i i j j
u uu u
u s v Q b a s u s v Q s
Q Q Q Q
     
  
        
   
* * * * * *, ;              (5a) 
 
and 
 
            
  if  0
k kk k
j jk k k k k k k k k k k k k k ki i
i ij ij ij i ij ij ij j ij ij ij j i ijk k k k
i i j j
u uu u
u s v Q b a s u s v Q s
Q Q Q Q
     
  
        
   
* * * * * *, .               (5b) 
 
Assume that the utility function associated with a particular location and a single class can depend upon the 
population associated with every class and each location, that is, compose a vector-function  u u Q . Assume also 
that the cost associated with migration between two locations as perceived by a particular class can depend, in 
general, upon the flow of each class between every pair of locations, i.e., compose an aggregate vector-function 
 c c s .  Finally, let us compose an auxiliary vector of the appropriate size as follows: 
 
                         
    kijd Q,s d Q,s ,  where  
k kk k
j jk k k k k k k k ki i
ij ij ij ij i ij ij ij jk k k k
i i j j
u uu u
d Q,s s v Q s v Q .
Q Q Q Q
    
  
   
   
      
 
Now we are in a position to formulate the following result, established in the previous papers Kalashnikov et al. 
(2007, 2008): 
 
Theorem 3.1. A population and migration flow pattern  * *Q ,s M satisfies the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) 
if, and only if it solves the variational inequality problem 
 
                         
       0* * * * * *u Q ,Q Q c s d Q ,s ,s s , Q,s M           .                                                    (6)  
 
The existence of at least one solution to the variational inequality (6) follows from the general theory of 
variational inequalities, under the sole assumption of continuous differentiability of the utility functions u and 
continuity of migration cost functions c, since the feasible convex set M is compact (cf., for example, Kinderlehrer 
and Stampacchia, 1980). 
        
From now on, we omit the superscript k for simplicity purpose. The uniqueness of the equilibrium 
population and migration flow pattern  * *Q ,s  follows under the assumption that the compound operator 
 
                                      
 
   
   1 1K n n K n nK n K nu Q : R R R R
c s d Q,s
      
 
     
, 
 
involving the utility and migration cost functions, is strictly monotone over the feasible set  M: 
 
                             
 
   
 
   
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 21 1 1 2 2 2
0    
u Q u Q Q Q Q Q
, , ,
s s s sc s d Q ,s c s d Q ,s
                                        
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that is, 
 
                
           1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0u Q u Q ,Q Q c s c s ,s s d Q ,s d Q ,s ,s s          .           (7) 
 
The latter is a consequence of the classical result of the Theory of Variational Inequality Problems (see, for 
example, Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia, 1980): 
 
Theorem 3.2. Consider the variational inequality: Find 
* ny M R  such that, 
 
                     0    * *F y , y y , y M    .                                                                                    (8) 
 
If the operator n nF : R R is strictly monotone, that is, 
 
                     
   1 2 1 2 1 20           F y F y , y y , y y ,      
 
then the variational inequality (8) has at most one solution. 
 
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the (lower level) equilibrium among the potential 
migrants, we may pass to the concept of the upper level equilibrium among the municipal authorities. 
 
3.2. Definition of Equilibrium in the Upper Level 
      
We assume that the utility function associated with location i and class k of potential migrants has the form  
 
                           
  ,
k
k k i
i i i i
i
B
u Q A Q
R
                                                                                                                     (9) 
 
where 0, 0
k k
i iA B   are parameters related to the environment facilities for the potential immigrants of class k in 
location i. For instance, the economical sense of 
k
iA  could be the average cost of a household in location i in a 
district where the typical representatives of class k prefer to settle down, while 
k
iB might be interpreted as an inverse 
adaptability coefficient for the immigrants of class k: that is, the lower value of 
k
iB , the higher the degree of 
adaptability revealed by the average family of the specimen of class k to the growing population of location i. 
Finally, the parameter 0iR  reflects the amount of investment by the authorities of location i into the improvement 
of the environment for the newcomers and the regular inhabitants: the higher the investment's amount, the lower the 
negative effect of the growing population on the location’s attractiveness for both the current and potential 
inhabitants. 
      
Now assuming that the investment volumes 0iR  are used as strategies of the players (municipal 
authorities of the locations involved), it is standard to define an equilibrium state in the (upper level) game. 
 
An investment vector  * * * *1 2, , , nR R R R is an equilibrium in the upper level, if for each location i, i = 
1,…, n, the municipal authority’s utility function  *,i i i iU U R R attains its maximum value exactly at *i iR R
(assuming that all the other players stick to their investment values  * * * * *1 1 1, , , , ,i i i nR R R R R   ). 
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Here, the municipality utility function  i iU U R is the weighted sum of the location’s utility functions of all the 
classes of potential migrants determined below: 
 
                      
     
1* *
1 * *
* *
,
K
Ki i
i i i
i i
Q Q
U R u Q u Q
Q Q
                                                                                        (10)  
 
where 
*Q is the equilibrium of the lower level population values, which (due to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) exist 
uniquely for any (fixed) vector of investments R involved into the structure of locations’ utility functions (9). 
 
4. EXISTENCE OF A BI-LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONSISTENT CONJECTURES 
 
The consistency of conjectures (or, the influence coefficients) arises naturally as an important issue. Indeed, 
the existence of at least one equilibrium for arbitrary influence coefficients obliges one to select some justified 
conjectures so that the above concept of the equilibrium make sense. In this section, we propose a concept of 
consistency and formulate the existence result for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium.       
 
Based upon the consistency criterion proposed in Kalashnikov et al. (2011), we formulate the following 
definition. Here, for simplicity, we repeat our assumption that the utility function for each location i and each 
potential migrant group k is linear of the form  
k
k k k ki
i i i i
i
B
u Q A Q
R
  , with 0 0 0k ki i iA ,B ,R   ; next, 0
k
ija  for 
each quadratic migration cost function; and finally, conjectures (influence coefficients) are constant, i.e., 0k ,ij
  , 
and 0  for all k k kij ij ijv v v , i, j,k.
     
 
Definition 4.1. At a lower level equilibrium (LLE) pattern  * *Q ,s M , the influence coefficients 
 1  1  kijv , k , ,K; i, j , ,n; i j   , are referred to as consistent, if the following equalities hold:  
 
                           
2
1
1
2
2
k
ij
j j jk
i j k
j
v .
a R
v
B






                                                                                                            (11)   
 
The LLE with consistent conjectures is called a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVES) in 
application to the above-described human migration model. 
 
Now we are in a position to formulate the following existence result. 
 
Theorem 4.1. Under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, and if all the investment sums are bounded (i.e., 
0 ,  1, ,iR R i n    ), then there exists a consistent conjectural equilibrium state (CCVES) in application to the 
above-described bi-level human migration model. 
 
When proving Theorem 4.1, we established that certain infinite-dimensional mappings involved in 
equations (11) are continuous and contracting over corresponding compact subsets. This allows one to find, for each 
fixed group k of potential migrant and each destination location j, good approximations for the consistent 
conjectures (influence coefficients)  1  1  kijv , k , ,K; i, j , ,n; i j   , by applying a simple iteration procedure: 
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 
 
1
2
1
  0 1
1
2
2
k , m
ij
j k , m j j
i j k
j
v , m , ,
a R
v
B



 



                                                                                       (12)  
 
with 
 0
0  1  1  
k ,
ijv , k , ,K; i, j , ,n; i j.     
 
Theorem 4.2. For each fixed group k of potential migrants and each destination location j, approximate conjectures 
(influence coefficients) 
 
 1  
k , m
ijv , i, j , ,n; i j,  obtained by formulas (12), converge (as m ) to the unique 
solution  
1
n
k k
j ij
i ,i j
v v
 
 of system (11).                                   
       
In our future research, we are going to extend the obtained results to the case of not necessarily linear utility 
functions and discontinuous conjectures (influence coefficients). However, some of the necessary technique can be 
developed now, in the case of linear utilities and continuous conjectures. To do that, for fixed values of k and j, we 
denote the value of the inverse of the derivative of the utility function  k k kj j ju u Q by 
 
                      
 
1
0
k
j k
jk
j
du
Q
dQ


 
  
  
,                                                                                              (13) 
 
and rewrite the consistency equalities (11) in a more general form: 
 
                        
2
1
1
2
2
k
ij
j jk
i j
v ,
a
v 






                                                                                              (14) 
 
where  0,   . When   , then the solution of system (14) tends to the unique limit solution 
1
 1  1  
2
k
ijv , k , ,K; i, j , ,n; i j    . For all the finite values of the parameter 0  we establish the following 
assertion. 
 
Theorem 4.3.  For each fixed group k of potential migrants and each destination location j, and for any  0,   , 
there exists a unique solution of equations (14) as a collection of continuous functions 
   1  k kij ijv v , i, j , ,n; i j   . Furthermore,    
1
0 0  and  as  for all  1  
2
k k
ij ijv , v , i, j , ,n; i j      .   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
We have investigated a human migration model involving conjectures of the migration groups concerning 
the variations of utility function values both in the abandoned location and in the destination site. To formulate 
equilibrium conditions in this model, we use the concept of conjectural variation equilibrium (CVE). We establish 
the existence and uniqueness results for the equilibrium in question, and introduced a concept of consistent 
conjectures (influence coefficients), together with the corresponding CVEs. The theorem guaranteeing the existence 
and uniqueness of solution to each consistency system and hence, the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium 
state (CCVES), has been also proved. 
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We also notice that the human migration model with conjectural variations can be further extended and 
examined in the case when constraint (2) is replaced by a weaker condition, say 
 
                   
0   1  1kiQ , i , ,n; k , ,K,                                                                           (15)  
 
which allows us to consider the repeated or chain migration. In this case the feasible set M stops being compact 
(remaining, however, convex), which makes insufficient the use of the general theory of variational inequality 
problems to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium. Then subtler results obtained in Bulavsky et al. (1998) and 
further developed in Isac et al. (2002) can be used to that effect. Indeed, the existence of equilibrium will be 
guaranteed for various classes of utility functions and migration costs that are free of exceptional families of 
elements (EFE). 
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